We study the possibility of computing cryptographic primitives in a fully-black-box arithmetic model over a finite field F. In this model, the input to a cryptographic primitive (e.g., encryption scheme) is given as a sequence of field elements, the honest parties are implemented by arithmetic circuits which make only a black-box use of the underlying field, and the adversary has a full (non-black-box) access to the field. This model captures many standard informationtheoretic constructions.
INTRODUCTION
This paper studies the possibility of solving cryptographic problems in a way which is independent from the underlying algebraic domain. We start by describing a concrete motivating example.
Consider the problem of computing over encrypted data where Alice wishes to store her private data x = (x1, . . . , xn) encrypted on a server while allowing the server to run some program f on the data. Let us assume that each data item xi is taken from some large algebraic domain F (e.g., finiteprecision reals) and, correspondingly, the program f is described as a sequence of arithmetic operations over F. Naturally, Alice would like to employ a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [27] . However, standard FHE constructions typically assume that the data is represented as a binary string and the computation f is represented by a Boolean circuit.
One way to solve the problem is to translate x and f to binary form. Unfortunately, this solution suffers from several limitation. First, such a translation is typically expensive as it introduces a large overhead (typically much larger than log |F|).
1 Secondly, such an emulation is not modular as it strongly depends on the bit-representation of x. Finally, in some scenarios Boolean emulation is simply not feasible since the parties do not have an access to the bitwise representation of the field elements. For example, the data items (x1, . . . , xn) may be already "encrypted" under some algebraic scheme (e.g., given at the exponent of some group generator or represented by some graded encoding scheme [26] ).
A better solution would be to have an FHE that supports F-operations. Striving for full generality, we would like to have an FHE that treats the field or ring F as an oracle which can be later instantiated with any concrete domain. In this paper we explore the feasibility of such schemes. More generally, we study the following natural question:
Which cryptographic primitives (if any) can be implemented independently of the underlying algebraic domain?
We formalize the above question via the following notion of arithmetic constructions of cryptographic primitives.
The Model
Cryptographic constructions.
Standard cryptographic constructions can be typically described by a tuple of efficient (randomized) algorithms P that implement the honest parties. The inputs to these algorithms consist of a binary string x ∈ {0, 1} * (e.g., plaintext/ciphertext) and a security parameter 1 λ which, by default, is taken to be polynomial in the length of the input x. These algorithms should satisfy some syntactic properties (e.g., "correctness") as well as some security definition. We assume that the latter is formulated via a game between an adversary and a challenger. The construction is secure for a class of adversaries (e.g., polynomial-size Boolean circuits) if no adversary in the class can win the game with probability larger than some predefined threshold.
Arithmetic constructions.
In our arithmetic model, the input x = (x1, . . . , xn) to the honest parties P is a vector of generic field elements. The honest parties can manipulate field elements by applying field operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and zero-testing). There is no other way to access the field elements. In particular, the honest parties do not have an access to the bit representation of the inputs or even to the size of F. We allow the honest parties to generate the field's constants 0 and 1, to sample random field elements, and to sample random bits. Overall, honest parties can be described by efficiently computable randomized arithmetic circuits.
In contrast to the honest parties, the adversary is nonarithmetic and is captured, as usual, by some class of probabilistic Boolean circuits (e.g., uniform circuits of polynomialsize). Security should hold for any (adversarial) realization of F. Formally, the standard security game is augmented with an additional preliminary step in which the adversary is allowed to specify a field by sending to the challenger a Boolean circuit which implements the field operations with respect to some (adversarially-chosen) binary representation. The game is continued as usual, where the adversary is now attacking the construction P F . Note that once F is specified, P F can be written as a standard Boolean circuit. Hence security in the arithmetic setting guarantees that the construction P F is secure for any concrete field oracle F which is realizable by our class of adversaries.
2 Example 1.1 (One-time encryption). We illustrate the model by defining an arithmetic perfectly-secure one-time encryption scheme. Syntactically, such a scheme consists of a key-generation algorithm KGen, encryption algorithm Enc, and decryption algorithm Dec which satisfy the perfect 2 Note that the computational complexity of the field representation is limited by the computational power of the adversary. Specifically, if the primitive is secure against polynomial-size circuits then the underlying field must be implementable by a polynomial-size circuit. This limitation is inherent (for computationally-secure schemes), as otherwise, one can use an inefficient field representation to break the scheme (e.g., by embedding an NP-complete oracle).
correctness condition:
for every message m ∈ F n . Perfect security can be defined via the following indistinguishability game: (1) For a security parameter 1 n , the adversary specifies a field F and a pair of messages m0, m1 ∈ F n ; (2) The challenger responds
The adversary outputs a bit b and wins the game if b = b. The scheme is perfectly-secure if no (computationally-unbounded) adversary can win the game with more than probability 1 2 . A simple generalization of the well-known one-time pad gives rise to an arithmetic one-time encryption scheme. The key generation algorithm samples a random key k R ← F n , to encrypt a message m ∈ F n we output m + k and to decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ F n we output the message c − k. All the above operations can be implemented by randomized arithmetic circuits. It is not hard to see that the scheme is perfectly-secure. Namely, for any field F (or even group) chosen by a computationally-unbounded adversary, the winning probability cannot exceed 
Our Contribution
Our goal in this paper is to find out which cryptographic primitives admit arithmetic constructions. We begin by observing that, similarly to the case of one-time pad, typical information-theoretic constructions naturally arithmetize. Notable examples include various secret sharing schemes [47, 21, 17] , and classical information-theoretic secure multiparty protocols [10, 15] . (See Section 1.4 for a detailed account of related works.) This raises the natural question of constructing computationally secure primitives in the arithmetic model. We give an affirmative answer to this question by providing arithmetic constructions of several computational primitives.
Informal Theorem 1.1. There are arithmetic constructions of public-key encryption, commitment scheme, oblivious linear evaluation (the arithmetic analog of oblivious transfer), and protocols for general secure multiparty computation without honest majority (e.g., two-party computation), assuming intractability assumptions related to linear codes.
We emphasize that our focus here is on feasibility rather than efficiency, and so we did not attempt to optimize the complexity of the constructions. The underlying intractability assumption essentially assumes the pseudorandomness of a matrix-vector pair (M,ỹ) where M is a random m×n generating matrix andỹ ∈ F m is obtained by choosing a random codeword y ∈ Span(M ) and replacing a random εm-subset of y's coordinates with random field elements.
3 This RandomLinear-Code assumption, which is denoted by RLC F (n, m, ε), was previously considered in [39] . If F is instantiated with the binary field, we get the standard Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption [30, 12] . Indeed, some of the primitives in the above theorem can be constructed by extending various LPN-based schemes from the literature. Theorem 1.1 shows that the arithmetic model is rich enough to allow highly non-trivial computational cryptography such as general secure two-party protocols. As a result, one may further hope to arithmetize all Boolean primitives. Our main results show that this is impossible. That is, we show that there are several cryptographic tasks which can be achieved in the standard model but cannot be implemented arithmetically. This include garbled circuits, secure computation protocols with "low" online communication, and multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes. Details follow.
Garbled circuits.
Yao's garbled circuit (GC) construction [50] maps any boolean circuit C : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m together with secret randomness into a "garbled circuit"Ĉ along with n "key" functions Ki : {0, 1} → {0, 1} k such that, for any (unknown) input x, the garbled circuitĈ together with the n keys Kx = (K1(x1), . . . , Kn(xn)) reveal C(x) but give no additional information about x. The latter requirement is formalized by requiring the existence of an efficient decoder which recovers C(x) from (Ĉ, Kx) and an efficient simulator which, given C(x), samples from a distribution which is computationally indistinguishable from (Ĉ, Kx). The keys are short in the sense that their length, k, depends only in the security parameter and does not grow with the input length or the size of C. Yao's celebrated result shows that such a transformation can be based on the existence of any pseudorandom generator [13, 49] , or equivalently a one-way function [34] . The definition of arithmetic garbled circuits naturally generalizes the Boolean setting. The target function C : F n → F m is now a formal polynomial (represented by an arithmetic circuit), and we would like to encode it into a garbled circuit C, along with n arithmetic key functions Ki : F → F k , such thatĈ together with the n outputs Ki(xi) reveal C(x) and no additional information about x. As in the Boolean case, we require the existence of an arithmetic decoder and simulator. We say that the garbling is short if the key-length depends only in the security parameter (i.e., can be taken to be n ε for an arbitrary ε > 0). A more relaxed notion is online efficiency, meaning that the key-length should be independent of the circuit complexity of C but may grow with the input length. (The latter requirement is typically viewed as part of the definition of garbling schemes, cf. [9] .)
The question of garbling arithmetic circuits has been open for a long time, and only recently some partial progress has been made [5] . Still, so far there has been no fully arithmetic construction in which both the encoder and the decoder make a black-box use of F. We show that this is inherently impossible answering an open problem from [35] .
Informal Theorem 1.2. There are no short arithmetic garbled circuits. Furthermore, assuming the existence of (standard) one-way functions, even online efficient arithmetic garbled circuits do not exist. The theorem holds even if the simulator is allowed to be non-arithmetic or even inefficient. The latter case corresponds to an indistinguishability notion of security.
Recall that in the Boolean setting short garbled circuits can be constructed based on any one-way function, hence, Theorem 1.2 "separates" the Arithmetic model from the Boolean model.
Secure computation with low online complexity.
Generalizing the above result, we prove a non-trivial lowerbound on the online communication complexity of semihonest secure computation protocols. Roughly speaking, we allow the parties to exchange all the messages which solely depend on internal randomness at an "offline phase", and then move to an "online phase" in which the parties receive their inputs and may exchange messages based on their inputs (as well as their current view). Such an online/offline model was studied in several works [8, 38, 11, 19, 37] . In the standard Boolean setting, there are protocols which achieve highly efficient online communication complexity. For example, for efficient deterministic two-party functionalities f : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m which deliver the output to one of the parties (hereafter referred to as simple functionalities), one can obtain semi-honest protocols with online communication of n 1+ε based on Yao's garbled circuit, or even n + o(n) based on the succinct garbled circuit of [6] . In contrast, we show that in the arithmetic model the online communication complexity must grow with the complexity of the function.
Informal Theorem 1.3. Assume that standard one-way functions exist. Then, for every constant c > 0 there exists a simple arithmetic two-party functionality f :
which cannot be securely computed by an arithmetic semihonest protocol with online communication smaller than Ω(n c ) field elements.
The theorem generalizes to the multiparty setting including the case of honest majority.
Multiplicative homomorphic encryption.
A multiplicative homomorphic encryption scheme is a standard public-key encryption scheme in which, given only the public key, one can transform a ciphertext c = Enc pk (x) and a scalar a ∈ F (given in the clear) into a fresh encryption c of the product a · x. Formally, we require an efficient transformation T such that, for every messages x, a ∈ F and almost all public keys pk, the distributions (c, c ) and
where c = Enc pk (x), c = T (pk, c, a)) and c = Enc pk (a · x), are identical. 5 Two well known examples for such schemes (over different fields) are Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [33] and ElGamal cryptosystem [23] .
We show that multiplicative homomorphic encryption cannot be implemented arithmetically. Unlike the previous theorems, our proof holds only in a strict arithmetic model where the honest algorithms are not allowed to use zerotesting gates and division gates.
Informal Theorem 1.4. There are no perfectly-correct multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes in the strict arithmetic setting. Furthermore, this holds even if the decryption algorithm is non-arithmetic or even inefficient.
The case of inefficient decryption algorithm corresponds to non-interactive perfectly binding commitments with multiplicative homomorphism. Interestingly, the commitments constructed in Theorem 1.1 (which are strictly arithmetic, non-interactive, perfectly binding, and regular) enjoy weak multiplicative homomorphism. Namely, only the marginals c and c , defined in (1), are identically distributed. So the main issue seems to be strong homomorphism, which cannot be achieved arithmetically, but can be easily achieved (for scalar multiplication) in the Boolean setting.
Discussion
Taken together, our positive and negative results suggest that the arithmetic model is highly non-trivial yet significantly weaker from the standard model. Beyond the natural interest in arithmetic constructions, our negative results explain, in retrospect, some of the limitations of previous results.
For example, [5] show that arithmetic garbled circuits can be constructed based on a special "key-shrinking" gadget, which can be viewed as a symmetric encryption over F with some homomorphic properties. They also provide an implementation of this gadget over the integers. This allows to garble circuits over the ring Zp in a "semi-arithmetic" model, in which the encoder can treat the inputs as integers and the decoder is non-arithmetic. Theorem 1.2 shows that these limitations are inherent. Specifically, we can conclude that there are no arithmetic constructions of the key-shrinking gadget. Similarly, Theorem 1.3 explains the high communication complexity of arithmetic MPC protocols such as the ones from [10, 15, 18, 39] .
Moreover, we believe that our results have interesting implications regarding the standard Boolean model. Inspired by computational complexity theory [7, 45, 1] , one can view our negative results as some form of a barrier.
The Arithmetization Barrier: If your construction "arithmetize" then it faces the lowerbounds.
LPN/RLC vs. LWE.
As an example, it seems that constructions which are based on the Learning-Parity-with-Noise assumption typically extend to the arithmetic setting under the RLC assumption. Therefore, "natural" LPN-based constructions are deemed to face our lower-bounds. Specifically, Theorem 1.4 suggests that it may be hard to design an LPNbased commitment with (strong) multiplicative homomorphism. Since such schemes can be easily constructed under Regev's Learning-With-Errors (LWE) assumption [46] , this exposes a qualitative difference between the two assumptions. Indeed, this gap between strong LWE-type homomorphism (as in Eq. 1) which can be applied repeatedly, and weak LPN-type homomorphism which can be applied only a small number of times, seems to be crucial. This gap may also explain why LWE has so many powerful applications (e.g., fully homomorphic encryption [14] ), while LPN is restricted to very basic primitives. The weak homomorphism supplied by typical LPN-based schemes was probably noticed by several researchers. The new insight, supplied by our arithmetic lower-bound, is that the lack of strong homomorphism is not just a limitation of a concrete construction, but it is, in fact, inherent to all arithmetic constructions. Quoting Pietrzak [44] one may wonder: ". . . is there a fundamental reason why the more general LWE problem allows for such objects, but LPN does not?" A simple answer would be: "LPN arithmetize but LWE doesn't."
IT constructions.
Another example, for which the arithmetization barrier kicks in, is the case of information-theoretic (IT) constructions. Most of the standard techniques in this domain (e.g., polynomial-based error correcting codes) arithmetize, and so these constructions are deemed to be restricted by our lower-bounds. We mention that, in the area of IT-secure primitives, proving lower-bounds (even non-constructively) is notoriously hard.
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The arithmetic model restricts the honest parties, and as a result makes lower-bounds much more accessible while still capturing most existing schemes. We therefore view the arithmetic setting as a new promising starting point for proving lower-bounds for informationtheoretic primitives.
From a more constructive perspective, instead of thinking of arithmetic lower-bounds as barriers, we may view them as road signs saying that in order to achieve some goals (e.g., basing homomorphic encryption on LPN), one must take a non-arithmetic route.
Previous Work
As already mentioned many information-theoretic primitives admit an arithmetic implementation. Notable examples include one-time MACs based on affine functions, Shamir's secret-sharing scheme [47] , the classical informationtheoretic secure multiparty protocols of [10, 15] and the randomized encodings of [36] . Extensions of these results to generic black-box rings were given in [21, 17, 18] .
Much less is known for computationally secure primitives. To the best of our knowledge, previous works only considered arithmetic models in which the honest parties have richer interface with the underlying field. (See below.) Therefore the resulting constructions do not satisfy our arithmetic notion.
The IPS model.
Most relevant to our work is the model suggested by Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai [39] (hereafter referred to as the IPS model) in the context of secure multiparty computation. In this model the parties are allowed to access the bit-representation of field elements, where the field and its representation are chosen by the adversary. This allows the honest parties to learn an upper-bound on the field size, and to feed field elements into a standard (Boolean) cryptographic scheme (e.g., encryption, or oblivious transfer). In contrast, such operations cannot be applied in our model. The work of Naor and Pinkas [43] yields semi-honest secure two-party protocols in the IPS model. Security against 6 A classical example is the share size of secret-sharing schemes for general access structure. The situation becomes even more involved when it comes to more complicated objects such as secure multiparty protocols. 7 For example, in the IPS model a party can trivially commit to a field element x ∈ F by applying a binary commitment to the bit-representation of x. This is not possible in our model as x can be manipulated only via the field operations. malicious adversaries (as well as generalization to general rings and efficiency improvements) were given by [39] . Both works rely on the existence of a Boolean Oblivious Transfer primitive.
Arithmetic reductions.
Another line of works provides arithmetic constructions of high-level primitives P (e.g., secure computation protocol) by making use of a lower-level primitive Q (e.g., arithmetic oblivious-transfer) which is defined with respect to the field F. This can be viewed as an arithmetic reduction from P to Q. Arithmetic reductions from secure multiparty computation to Threshold Additive Homomorphic Encryption were given by [25] for the semi-honest model, and were extended by [16] to the malicious model (assuming that the underlying encryption is equipped with special-purpose zero-knowledge protocols). Similarly, the results of [5] can be viewed as an arithmetic reduction from garbling arithmetic circuits to the design of a special symmetric encryption over F.
The Generic Group Model.
It is instructive to compare our arithmetic model to the Generic Group Model (GGM) and its extensions [48, 42, 41, 2] . The generic group model is an idealized model, where the adversary's computation is independent of the representation of the underlying cryptographic group (or ring). In contrast, in our model the honest players are arithmetic (independent of the field), while the adversary is non-arithmetic and has the power to specify the field and its representation. These two models also serve very different purposes: The GGM allows to prove unconditional hardness results against "generic attacks", while our model allows to increase the usability of cryptographic constructions by making them "field independent". Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the difference between the models is to see what happens when the ideal oracle is instantiated with a concrete field or ring. In our model, the resulting Boolean construction will remain secure by definition, whereas in the GGM the resulting scheme may become completely insecure [20] .
TECHNIQUES: NEGATIVE RESULTS
In a high level, our main (negative) results are obtained by reducing the task of attacking arithmetic primitives to the task of "analyzing" arithmetic circuits. We solve the latter problem by making a novel use of tools (most notably partial derivatives) that were originally developed in the context of arithmetic complexity theory. In a sense, our lower-bounds show that algorithms for arithmetic circuits can be used to attack arithmetic constructions. Below we give an outline of the proofs of the main negative results.
For ease of presentation, we sketch (in Section 2.1) a version of Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 in the Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) model of [24] , which is conceptually simpler than garbled circuits and general secure computation protocols. Section 2.2 contains an overview of the proof of Theorem 1.4.
Lower Bounds in the PSM model
The PSM model.
Consider two parties Alice and Bob that have private inputs x and y, respectively, and a shared random string r.
Alice and Bob are each allowed to send a single message to a third party Carol, from which Carol is to learn the value of f (x, y) for some predefined function f , but nothing else. The goal is to minimize the communication complexity. In the standard (Boolean) setting, one can use garbled circuits to obtain a protocol in which Alice's communication depends only on her input length and the security parameter k, and is independent of Bob's input length or the complexity of f . Specifically, under standard cryptographic assumptions, Alice's message A(x; r) can be of length |x| · k [24] , or even |x| + k [6] . In contrast, we will prove that, in the arithmetic model, the length of Alice's message A(x; r) must grow with Bob's input. Let Alice's input x ∈ F be a single field element, let Bob's input y consist of two column vectors y1, y2 ∈ F n , and let f (x, (y1, y2)) = x · y1 + y2 be the target function. We will show that if Alice's message is shorter than n, Carol can learn some non-trivial information about Bob's input. In patricular, Carol will output a non-zero vector which is orthogonal to y1. (This clearly violates privacy as it allows Carol to exclude 1/|F| fraction of all possible inputs for Bob.) Let us assume, for now, that the parties do not use division or zero-testing gates, and so all the parties are simply polynomials over F.
We begin with a few observations. Fix the shared randomness r, Bob's input y, and Bob's message b = B(y; r), and consider the residual polynomials of Alice and Carol.
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Alice computes a vector of univariate polynomials Ar(x) : F → F n−1 which takes her input x ∈ F and outputs a message a ∈ F n−1 , and Carol computes a vector of multivariate polynomials C b (a) : F n−1 → F n which maps Alice's message a ∈ F n−1 to a vector of field elements z ∈ F n . By the correctness of the protocol, we have that
where fy 1 ,y 2 (x) = x · y1 + y2. Let us fix a field F whose characteristic is larger than the degree of the polynomial C b (Ar(x)). 9 Over such a large field, the univariate polynomial in the RHS of (2) and the univariate polynomial in the LHS are formally equivalent, namely, they represent the same polynomial in F[X]. As a result, their formal partial derivatives are also equivalent:
By the definition of f the LHS simplifies to y1, and by applying the chain rule to the RHS we get
Syntactically, ∂Ar(x) is a (column) vector of n−1 univariate polynomials that contains, for each output of Ar(x) : F → F n−1 , the derivative with respect to the formal variable x. Similarly, the Jacobian matrix J C b (a) : F n−1 → F n×n−1 is a matrix of multivariate polynomials whose (i, j)-th entry is the partial derivative of the i-th output of C b (a) : F n−1 → F n with respect to the j-th input (the formal variable aj).
Let us now get back to Carol's attack. Carol does not know r and therefore she cannot compute neither Ar(x) nor its derivative ∂Ar(x). However, she knows b and therefore can compute a circuit for C b , which, by using standard techniques, can be transformed into a circuit for the Jacobian J C b . Carol also received from Alice a message a = Ar(x), where x is Alice's input, and so Carol can evaluate the circuit J C b at the point a and obtain the matrix M = J C b (a) ∈ F n×(n−1) . Now, the key observation is that
Indeed, this follows by evaluating the RHS of (4) at the point x (and taking v = ∂Ar(x)). Overall, Carol now holds a matrix M whose columns span Bob's input y1 ∈ F n . Since M has only n − 1 columns, Carol can find a non-zero vector which is orthogonal to y1 and break the security of the protocol.
Handling zero-test gates.
If the parties use zero-test gates then the functions computed by Alice and Carol are not polynomials anymore. As a result, (3) does not hold since the partial derivative of the function P (x) = C b (Ar(x)) is not defined. To solve the problem we show that it is possible to remove the zero-test gates. Assume, for simplicity, that the circuit P (x) contains a single zero-test gate which is applied to the expression Q(x). Note that Q(x) is a polynomial of degree d which is much smaller than the field. We distinguish between two cases: If Q is the zero polynomial we remove the gate and replace its outcome with the constant 0; otherwise, we replace the gate with the constant 1. This transformation changes the value of P on at most d points (the roots of Q), and therefore, the resulting polynomial P agrees with the polynomial fy 1 ,y 2 on all but d points. Since both functions are low degree polynomials we conclude that they must be equal. The above argument easily generalizes to a large number of zero-test gates.
Some technicality arises due to the fact that the attacker Carol does not have an access to P , and can only compute its "outer part" C b . To see the problem, imagine that C b contains a zero-check gate which is applied to a non-zero polynomial Q which vanishes over the image of Ar. In this case, the above procedure (applied to C b alone) will fail miserably. We solve this issue by showing that, given a random point in the image of Ar, one can remove the zero-test gates from C b in a way which is consistent with the "inner part" Ar. Since Carol can get such a point a = Ar(x) from Alice the attack goes through. The more general setting in which the parties may also use division gates is handled similarly (except for some minor technicalities).
Extensions.
The above argument shows that Alice's communication grows with the length of Bob's input. A stronger result would say that Alice's communication grows with the complexity of the function (even if Bob's input is also short). We can prove such a result via the use of a standard (Boolean) pseudorandom generator (PRG). Roughly speaking, we embed a binary PRG in the function f such that a low communication protocol allows to break the pseudroandomness of the PRG. This approach extends to the setting of arithmetic garbled circuits and general secure multiparty protocols yielding Theorems 1.2 and 1.3.
Impossibility of Multiplicative Homomorphic Encryption
To prove Theorem 1.4 we show that in order to attack multiplicative homomorphic encryption, it suffices to estimate the entropy of some probability distribution which is represented by a given arithmetic circuit. The idea is simple: given a public-key pk and an encryption C = Enc pk (y) of an unknown plaintext y ∈ {0, 1}, we use the multiplicative homomorphism to construct the circuit f C,pk (x) which maps a plaintext x ∈ F into a fresh encryption of x · y. Consider the probability distribution of f C,pk (x) induced by a uniform choice of x R ← F and the internal randomness of the homomorphic evaluator (here C and pk are viewed as fixed constants). If C is an encryption of 0 then f C,pk (x) is simply a fresh encryption of the zero element. In contrast, if C is an encryption of 1 (or any non-zero element) then f C,pk (x) is a fresh encryption of a random field element. Intuitively, the latter distribution should have larger entropy than the first one. At this point we employ the algorithm of Dvir et al. [22] which, given an arithmetic circuit f , estimates the min-entropy of the distribution sampled by f . 
TECHNIQUES: POSITIVE RESULTS
Our positive results (Theorem 1.1) are based on three different approaches -outlined below.
Arithmetic/Binary Symmetric Encryption
One main approach is based on a new abstract notion of arithmetic/binary symmetric encryption (ABE). An ABE is an arithmetic symmetric encryption scheme which allows to encrypt a field element using a binary key. That is, while the scheme works in the arithmetic model, the key is essentially a string of bits given as a sequence of 0-1 field elements. Such an encryption scheme allows us to import binary constructions to the arithmetic setting, and can be therefore viewed as a bridge between the binary world to the arithmetic world.
Given, for example, a standard binary public-key encryption scheme we obtain a new arithmetic public-key encryption by working in a hybrid mode. Namely, to encrypt a message x ∈ F, encrypt x via the ABE under a fresh private binary key k, and then use the binary public-key encryption to encrypt the binary message k. Conveniently, for this purpose it suffices to have a one-time secure ABE.
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Similarly to the case of public-key encryption, ABE can be used to obtain arithmetic constructions of CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption, and commitment schemes. In order to achieve arithmetic secure computation protocols, we will need an additional "weak homomorphism property": Given a ciphertext E k (x) and field elements a, b ∈ F, it should be possible to generate a new ciphertext c which decrypts to ax + b. (The new ciphertext c does not have to look like a fresh ciphertext -hence the term "weak homomorphism" -and so this does not contradict our negative results.) For technical reasons, we also require a "simple" de-cryption algorithm (e.g., one that can be implemented by a polynomial-size arithmetic formula or branching program).
ABE based on RLC.
We show that such a one-time secure ABE can be obtained under the (generalized) Random Linear Code assumption RLC F (n, m, ε). To encrypt a message x, sample a random generating matrix A R ← F m×n together with a random ε-noisy codeword y, encode the message x via a repetition code, and use the noisy codeword y to mask the encoded message x · 1m. The resulting ciphertext consists of the pair (A, y + x · 1m). The private-key is the set of all noisy coordinates, described as a binary vector. Decryption can be implemented by ignoring the noisy coordinates and solving a set of linear equations over F. For properly chosen constants m/n and ε, the system will have a unique solution, with all but negligible probability.
From ABE to secure computation.
Let us explain how to construct secure arithmetic twoparty computation from an ABE with weak homomorphism. The construction can be viewed as a variant of the construction of [39] . Recall that a (binary) one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (
-OT) is a two-party functionality which takes two inputs a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1} n from a sender, and a selection bit x ∈ {0, 1} from the receiver and delivers to the receiver the value ax.
We begin by converting a maliciously-secure binary -AOT) in which the sender's inputs a0, a1 ∈ F are two field elements. The transformation uses an ABE in the natural way: The sender encrypts the arithmetic messages a0 and a1 under binary keys k0, k1, and sends the ciphertexts to the receiver; then the receiver uses the binary 2 1 -OT to select one of two keys k0, k1.
Next, we convert -AOT to Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE). The latter functionality takes two field elements a, b ∈ F from a sender, and another field element x ∈ F from the receiver and delivers to the receiver the value ax + b. The construction makes use of the ABE again, this time exploiting the weak homomorphism. Specifically, the receiver sends the ciphertext c = E k (x), and the sender uses the homomorphism to generate a ciphertext c which decrypts to ax+b. This ciphertext cannot be sent back to the receiver as it leaks information on a and b. Instead, a secure two-party computation protocol for decrypting c is invoked. Since the input of the receiver is binary (and decryption has lowcomplexity), such a protocol can be implemented efficiently via a -AOT (e.g., via the protocols of [18] ). 12 This gives a semi-honest OLE.
At this point, we can use the semi-honest OLE together with an arithmetic variant of the classical GMW protocol [32] to obtain an arithmetic secure computation protocol for general arithmetic functions in the semi-honest model. This protocol can be transformed to the malicious setting using the IPS compiler [38] . To make the compiler work in our arithmetic setting, we need two additional tools: arithmetic multiparty protocol with security against a constant fraction of malicious parties (which can be constructed based 12 For our concrete ABE, one can directly use 2 1 -AOT to securely deliver a re-randomized version of c . on [10] or [18] ), and a maliciously-secure 2 1 -AOT (which we already constructed).
Alternative approaches
Let us briefly mention two alternative approaches that can be used to derive arithmetic constructions for some of the primitives mentioned in Theorem 1.1.
Arithmetizing LPN-based scheme.
As already mentioned, existing LPN-based schemes easily extend to the arithmetic setting under the (generalized) Random Linear Code assumption. This gives alternative arithmetic constructions for primitives like symmetric encryption [28] , commitments [4, 40] , and even public-key encryption [3] and 2 1 -AOT. This "direct approach" is inferior to the first (ABE-based) approach in terms of the strength of the underlying assumption. For example, using the direct approach, in order to obtain an arithmetic public-key encryption, we have to assume RLC(n, m, ε) for constant-rate code m = O(n) and sub-constant noise rate ε = O(1/ √ n). In the case of CPA-secure symmetric encryption, the direct approach requires hardness for any polynomial m = m(n) and constant noise ε. In contrast, for both primitives, the ABE-based approach requires only hardness for constant rate codes m = O(n) and constant noise rate ε. While all three assumptions are consistent with our knowledge, the third assumption is formally weaker than (i.e., implied by) the first two.
Arithmetizing Cryptographic Transformations.
Another way to construct arithmetic primitives is to start with some direct construction of a simple primitive P , and then use a standard (binary) cryptographic transformation from P to a more complex primitive Q. For this, we have to translate the binary transformation to the arithmetic setting. Indeed, in some cases, existing binary transformations have a straightforward arithmetic analog. For example, we already mentioned that the classical GMW construction [32] of semi-honest secure computation from oblivious transfer (OT) naturally extends to the arithmetic setting [39] . Similarly, we show that Naor's transform from PRGs to commitments has an arithmetic analog. This provides another arithmetic construction of commitments whose security can be reduced to the RLC assumption.
Interestingly, some binary cryptographic transforms do not seem to arithmetize. This typically happens if the construction inspects some input xi ∈ {0, 1} and applies different operations depending on whether xi equals to zero or xi equals to one. This kind of arbitrary conditioning cannot be implemented in the arithmetic setting as xi varies over a huge (possibly exponential size) domain. As a typical example, consider the classical GGM construction [29] of pseudorandom functions (PRFs) from pseudorandom generators (PRGs). In the GGM construction, the value of the PRF F k on a point x ∈ {0, 1} n is computed by walking on an exponential size tree of length-doubling PRGs, where the i-th step is chosen based on the i-th bit of the input. It is not clear how to meaningfully adopt such a walk to the arithmetic case in which xi ∈ F. Similar "conditioning structure" appears in the Goldreich-Levin construction of hardcore predicates [31] , and Yao's construction of garbled circuits from one-way functions. In fact, in the latter case our negative results show that finding an arithmetic analog of the binary construction is provably impossible. The problem of proving a similar negative result for the case of PRF, or, better yet, coming up with an arithmetic construction of a PRF, is left open for future research.
